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Abstract 
Sport teams have historically been reluctant to change ticket prices during the 
season. Recently, however, numerous sport organizations have implemented variable 
ticket pricing in an effort to maximize revenues. In Major League Baseball, variable 
pricing results in ticket price increases or decreases depending on factors such as quality 
of the opponent, day of the week, month of the year, and for special events such as 
opening day, Memorial Day and Independence Day (July 4).  Using censored regression 
and elasticity analysis, this paper demonstrates that variable pricing would have yielded 
approximately $590,000 per year in additional ticket revenue for each Major League 
team in 1996, ceteris paribus.  Accounting for capacity constraints, this amounts to only 
about a 2.8% increase above what occurs when prices are not varied.  For the 1996 
season, the largest revenue gain would have been the Cleveland Indians, who would have 
generated an extra $1.4 million in revenue.  The largest percentage revenue gain would 
have been the San Francisco Giants.  The Giants would have seen an estimated 6.7% 
increase in revenue had they used optimal variable pricing. 
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Variable Ticket Pricing in Major League Baseball 
Variable ticket pricing (VTP) has recently been a much-discussed topic in the 
business of sport, especially as it relates to professional baseball, professional hockey, 
and college football (King, 2003; Rovell, 2002b).  VTP refers to changing the price of a 
ticket to a sporting event based on the expected demand for that event.  For example, 
Major League Baseball’s (MLB) Colorado Rockies had four different price levels for the 
same seat throughout the season (Cameron, 2002).  The different price levels were based 
primarily on the time of the year (summer vs. spring or fall), day of the week (weekends 
vs. weekdays), holidays (Memorial Day, Independence Day, etc.), the quality of the 
Rockies’ opponent, or their opponents’ star players (e.g., Barry Bonds).  The same seat in 
the outfield pavilion section of Coors Field, the Rockies’ home stadium, ranged in price 
in 2004 from a high of $21 for what the Rockies labeled as “Marquee” games to a low of 
$11 for what were considered “Value” games. MLB teams who utilized variable ticket 
pricing in 2004 are detailed in Table 1.  Other sport organizations besides MLB 
franchises utilize VTP as well.  Several National Hockey League (NHL) teams utilize 
VTP strategies, as do a number of intercollegiate athletics programs (Rooney, 2003; 
Rovell, 2002b). 
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
Some MLB teams have concluded that their 81 home games are not 81 units of 
the same product, but rather, based on the aforementioned characteristics such as the day 
of the week and quality of the opponent, are 81 unique products.  As such, the 81 unique 
products should each be priced according to their own characteristics that make them 
more or less attractive to the potential consumer.  MLB attendance studies support this 
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notion.  For example, in a study including more than 50 independent variables in 
explaining MLB game attendance, McDonald and Rascher (2000) found variables such 
as day of the week, home and visiting teams’ winning percentages, and weather among 
many others to be statistically significant predictors of game attendance.  Clearly, a 
variety of factors make some games more appealing and others less appealing to 
consumers.  It seems quite logical to price tickets to these games at different price levels, 
especially with teams constantly searching for revenue sources to compete with their 
opponents for players (Howard & Crompton, 2004; Zimbalist, 2003). 
Varying quality of games throughout a season often creates a secondary market, 
as demand for the most popular games may exceed available supply. Independent ticket 
agents, or scalpers, broker tickets obtained from various sources to fans unable or 
unwilling to purchase tickets from a team’s ticket office or licensed ticket agency (Caple 
2001; Reese, 2004).  Ticket scalpers respond to market demands (often in violation of 
city ordinances or state laws), but the team initially selling the ticket does not realize any 
increased revenue during a scalper’s transaction (“History of Ticket Scalping,” n.d.). For 
this reason, the Chicago Cubs have recently permitted ticket holders to auction their 
Wrigley Field tickets on a Cubs affiliated website with a fee being paid to the Cubs for 
this service (Rovell, 2002a; see also www.buycubstickets.com). It is believed that 
instituting a comprehensive VTP policy would diminish the influence of scalpers and 
permit greater revenue to be generated by the team for highly demanded games. 
Many industries have previously embraced the variable pricing concept as a 
method to increase revenue and to provide more efficient service to consumers (Bruel, 
2003; Rovell, 2002b). Airline flights are typically more expensive for selected days of the 
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week (Monday, Fridays), times of the day (morning, late afternoon), and days of the year 
(holidays), when travel demand is higher. The airlines also utilize variable pricing to 
encourage passengers to book their flights early (typically a purchase at least 10-14 days 
in advance generates a lower fare) or in some cases at the last minute (“Travel Tips,” 
2004). Hotel pricing characteristically reflects expected demand, even though the actual 
physical product does not change, as rooms for weekends or holidays are usually higher 
priced than weekdays or off-season visits. In fact, sometimes variable pricing even relates 
to major sporting events like the Super Bowl.  Many hotels substantially raise room rates 
during Super Bowl week (Baade and Matheson, n.d.). Other industries, like 
transportation, utilize variable pricing, where some toll roads now charge higher toll rates 
during peak times and lower rates during off-peak times (“Group Commends…,” 2001). 
The arts use variable pricing as well, such as matinee movie pricing (Riley, 2002). 
Sports franchises are moving forward with VTP strategies before sufficient 
research has been done to empirically evaluate its specific merits to the industry.  This 
article provides a straightforward assessment of optimal VTP.  First, a review of the 
literature reveals difficulties in estimating the nature of demand functions in sports.  
Specifically, optimal pricing is partially determined by price elasticities of demand, yet it 
is difficult to estimate ticket price elasticities that are consistent over time.  Next, a theory 
of complementary demand is explained that will account for non-ticket products and 
services and the effect that ticket prices have on the demand for these products and 
services.  Then, using individual game data from the 1996 MLB season, ticket prices and 
corresponding quantities are estimated that would have maximized ticket revenue.  These 
are compared to actual prices and revenue to determine the yield from initiating a 
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variable ticket pricing policy.  The final section contains a discussion of the implications 
of the results.  In summary, this article shows that there are financial benefits from 
implementing VTP, details how much can be gained from a general VTP policy, and 
provides strategies for implementing VTP.  
Review of Literature 
Price Elasticity of Demand in Sports 
While the literature specifically investigating VTP in sport is limited, the 
literature on estimating demand functions and the corresponding elasticities for sporting 
events is extensive. Typically, these studies estimate the price elasticity of demand to see 
whether sports teams are setting price to maximize revenue (or profit if it can be shown 
that variable costs are relatively negligible).  In practice, one could adjust season ticket 
prices and institute a VTP policy that increases revenue based on the results of elasticity 
studies. One problem is that the results are not consistent across studies.  One explanation 
for this is that it is reasonable for prices to be set in the elastic, inelastic, or unit elastic 
portion of demand under various circumstances.  For instance, profit maximization 
results in prices that are in the elastic portion of demand if marginal costs are above zero.  
If marginal costs are not above zero, then optimal prices are such that profit 
maximization equals revenue maximization – and that occurs at unit elasticity.  However, 
if other revenue streams are accounted for, such as concessions or parking, then optimal 
pricing can be in the inelastic portion of demand.  Thus, each of these three demand 
elasticity pricing strategies is justifiable.  It is generally assumed in sports ticket pricing 
that the marginal cost of selling an extra seat is so low as to make the elastic part of 
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demand not optimal in terms of pricing. Any price from unit elasticity down into the 
inelastic portion of demand is a likely finding as shown in the literature. 
Noll’s (1974) point estimates for elasticity for baseball were -0.49 for the 1970 
and 1971 seasons.  For the 1984 MLB season, Scully (1989) estimated point elasticities 
of -0.63 and -0.76.  Boyd and Boyd (1996) used Scully’s 1984 data, but added a measure 
of competition (recreational index for each city) and used a recursive feedback loop that 
incorporated the effects of home field advantage.  Namely, not only do more wins 
increase attendance, but enhanced attendance improves winning as a greater home field 
advantage is created.  In this study, point elasticities ranged from -0.58 to -1.20.  Hence, 
Boyd and Boyd discovered elasticities that were in the expected range, near or above unit 
elasticity.  It is important to note that economists have a habit of referring to price 
elasticities as being positive even though they are actually negative.  A price elasticity of 
–1.5 is in the expected range for a profit maximizing decision maker.  In fact, any price 
elasticity that is –1.0 or lower (meaning –1.5 or –2.0) is consistent with profit 
maximization.  However, a price elasticity of –2.0 will often be called a higher elasticity 
than –0.8, referring to the absolute value of elasticity and ignoring the sign (which is 
always negative). 
Scully, Noll, and Boyd and Boyd’s estimates all had large enough confidence 
intervals on the ticket price coefficient to not exclude unit elasticity as a possibility.  In 
other words, none of those studies could reject the hypothesis that teams set ticket prices 
to maximize revenue.  However, a study by Whitney (1988), that utilized more 
observations than those discussed above, did yield an estimate of price elasticity that fell 
within the inelastic portion of demand.  Further, Marburger (1997) found price elasticities 
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in the inelastic part of demand using annual team-level data covering a twenty-year 
period. The implications of inelastic pricing will be explained in the Theoretical 
Foundations section. 
Fort (2004) recently summarized the literature on spectator sports demand 
analysis and the difficulty in measuring price elasticities. He noted that simply analyzing 
one revenue stream makes it appear that pricing is not profit maximizing, and that a more 
complete accounting of all revenue streams (e.g., tickets, concessions, and local 
television) is consistent with profit maximization pricing. Given this discussion of price 
elasticities and profit maximization, this study incorporates models attempting to include 
the relationship between ticket and concession prices.  
Ticket Pricing Issues 
It has been difficult for researchers to show profit-maximizing ticket pricing by 
sports teams.  There are a number of reasons for this besides the inclusion of other 
revenue streams.  First, most pricing data that is used is a simple average of prices that 
are available for various seats for each team each season.  Currently, Team Marketing 
Report (TMR) collects pricing data that some researchers have used (e.g., Rishe & 
Mondello, 2004, and Rascher, 1999).  While it is likely an improvement over previously 
collected pricing data, it has lacked consistency across teams and over time.  Numerous 
discussions by the authors and TMR have revealed that TMR is able to separate out the 
luxury suite ticket prices.  TMR has also separated out club seating prices for some 
teams, but not all teams.  Further, this varies across seasons.  TMR relies on the teams to 
self-report.  Because of the prominence of the TMR Fan Cost IndexTM, some teams 
potentially manipulate their reported prices to appear relatively inexpensive.  Moreover, 
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the number of seats available at each price level does not typically weight these prices.  
Additionally, the number of seats sold is generally known in aggregate, not separated by 
seat price.  Second, Demmert (1973) noted that there is a correlation between population 
and ticket price across many seasons (likely based on the connection to income where 
higher populated areas earn higher incomes, hence increasing demand and therefore 
prices).  This multicollinearity can cloud the interpretation of coefficients on price.  
Third, as Salant (1992) pointed out, the long-run price of tickets may be optimal 
(adjusting for risk), but in the short-run a team may be over- or under-pricing in order to 
maintain consistency.  This is a form of insurance where the team bears the risk.  Fourth, 
similar to Fort’s (2004) findings, ticket prices may be kept relatively low in order to 
increase the number of attendees to an event who are likely to spend more money on 
parking, concessions, and merchandise, and who will drive up sponsorship revenue for 
the team, thus maximizing overall revenues rather than simply focusing on ticket 
revenues.   
DeSerpa (1994) discussed the rationality of apparently low season ticket prices.  
Even though many games sell out in the NBA and NFL (focal sports in his study), it is 
rational for the seller to price below the myopic short-run demand price in order to give a 
fan a reason to purchase season tickets.  In fact, DeSerpa discussed the possibility, but 
unlikeliness, of charging different prices for each event based on its demand.  He 
surmised that it was administratively expensive and subject to potential negative fan 
reaction.  
DeSerpa (1994) also noted that it is optimal to under-price season tickets if fans 
will likely want to attend only some of the games and resell the tickets for the remaining 
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contests. The season ticket must be priced low enough for holders to be able to, at the 
least, recoup their initial investment after assuming the transaction costs of resale (e.g., 
time, effort, search costs, and actual costs such as postage and advertising). Lower priced 
season tickets also potentially created a home field advantage for teams. Each argument 
or concern DeSerpa proffered can be addressed in a variable ticket pricing system. 
Marburger (1997) developed a model showing that pricing on the inelastic portion 
of demand can be explained by accounting for non-ticket purchases, such as concessions.    
Marburger noted that baseball teams set price on the inelastic portion of demand, but he 
did not investigate whether it was based on concessions decisions, just that it occurs.  
Under multiple methods of measuring ticket price, Coates and Harrison (forthcoming) 
found that ticket demand is also quite price inelastic. 
Variable Pricing Literature 
Specific to variable pricing, Heilman and Wendling (1976) analyzed ticket price 
discounting by the Milwaukee Bucks of the National Basketball Association (NBA).  The 
Bucks discounted prices from $5 to $2 and from $3.50 to $2 for 15 games of the 1974-75 
season. The fifteen 1973-74 games that corresponded to the 1974-75 discounted games 
averaged 9,307 fans and had only three sellouts. The discounted 1974-75 games averaged 
10,396 fans and had nine sellouts. Certainly, several factors (winter weather, player 
injuries, or even reversion to the mean) beyond the discounted price could have 
contributed to the attendance increases. However, other teams did not duplicate the 
Bucks’ attempt to discount tickets. Though the increase in attendance may appear 
minimal and be due to other factors besides discounting, when ancillary revenue sources 
(parking, concessions, and merchandise sales) are added to the cost of a ticket, further 
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investigation into VTP was warranted. However, the Bucks remained one of the few 
teams in American professional sport to implement a form of variable ticket pricing until 
1999 (King, 2002a; Rovell, 2002a).  
While some research has been conducted regarding VTP, this limited body of 
knowledge is not yet sufficient to provide evidence concerning the merits of using VTP 
to set single-game ticket prices for sporting events. Despite this lack of information, some 
teams have implemented variable pricing, while others have remained skeptical (King, 
2002a). This study investigates the financial gains of VTP and provides some direction 
regarding how it should be implemented in Major League Baseball. 
Theoretical Foundations 
The demand for baseball games changes from game to game, partially because the 
quality and the perception of the quality of the home and visiting teams vary as well as 
non-performance factors such as day of the week or month.  For a given price, Table 2 
(columns 2 and 3) shows that there is a large variance in attendance across games.  The 
average deviation from the mean is nearly 23%.  For 11 of the Atlanta Braves’ 81 home 
games, the deviation from the mean is over 30%, and the Braves are not even in the top 
half of teams with high attendance variation.  
Insert Table 2 about here. 
 
In general, many organizations are trying to minimize the effect of team 
performance, one of the key factors in the changing demand from game to game, on 
demand (Brockington, 2003; George, 2003).  As shown in the literature, team 
performance is one of the most significant demand factors that can be affected by an 
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owner.  For example, Bruggink and Eaton (1996) and Rascher (1999) analyzed game-by-
game attendance and the importance of team performance.  Using annual data, Alexander 
(2001) showed that the variable with the highest statistical significance is the number of 
games behind the leader, a measure of team performance.  Teams are building new 
stadiums, improving concessions and restaurants, and creating areas where kids and 
adults can enjoy themselves, but not necessarily watch the game itself (George, 2003).  
These improvements not only increase demand, but also lessen the importance that team 
performance uncertainty has on expected revenues. 
Concurrently, teams are beginning to use variable pricing to attempt to manage 
shifting demand from game to game given that they are unable to completely remove the 
variation.  The theory upon which this analysis is based is simply short-run revenue 
maximization with two goods that are complementary.  Tickets and concessions are 
complementary goods.  The demand for tickets is higher if concessions prices are lower 
because the overall cost of enjoying the game would be higher (Marburger, 1997; Fort, 
2004).  Similarly, the demand for concessions is higher if ticket prices are lower.  The 
model consists of demand for tickets and a separate aggregate demand for non-ticket 
products and services (hereafter referred to as concessions) that is affected by ticket price.  
This is where the complementarity between the two demand functions occurs.  The three 
models below describe increasing degrees of complexity for the relationship between 
ticket demand and concessions demand.  As shown below, VTP policies should account 
for the extent to which complementarity exists between ticket demand and non-ticket 
demand.  
For Model 1, let 
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1111 PQ βα −=          (1.1) 
be the demand for tickets, where  is quantity demanded,  is ticket price, and 1Q 1P 1α  and 
1β  are scalars describing the shape of the demand curve.  In this model, the demand for 
concessions, , will be unaffected by ticket prices.  The optimal revenue maximizing 
ticket price is  
2Q
1
1*
1 2β
α=P .         (1.2) 
The price elasticity of demand ( PQη ) at  and , where*1P *1Q 121*1 α=Q , is equal to negative 
one, a common result from microeconomic theory.  Thus, in the model, price is chosen 
where 1−=PQη .  This model is applicable for teams that do not share in concessions 
revenues or simply receive a fixed annual payment for concessions rights from a vendor, 
perhaps having sold them up front to build a new stadium.  In general, much of the costs 
associated with operating a baseball team are fixed costs.  The marginal costs of selling 
an extra ticket are low; hence revenue maximization will be assumed in place of profit 
maximization. Relaxing this assumption adds a marginal cost term to the analysis, but 
does not change the fundamental findings.  The marginal costs of MLB teams are 
unknown, and therefore the empirical analysis does not incorporate it. 
Model 2 is applicable for teams that receive all or a share of concessions revenue.  
Let 
1111 PQ βα −=          (2.1) 
be ticket demand as in Model 1.  Further, let 12 QQ = , meaning that each person who 
purchases a ticket also buys some concessions.  Moreover the price of concessions is 
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exogenously determined by the concessionaire and will be noted by 2P .  Note that 
concessions do have a non-negligible marginal cost that affects total profitability.  A 
more complete model would include marginal cost in the final optimal ticket price setting 
equation.  However, this would add unnecessary complexity, and more importantly, make 
it more cumbersome to compare to Model 1 to see how price is affected.  The resulting 
optimal revenue maximizing ticket price is 
22
2
1
1*
1
PP −= β
α .        (2.2) 
As seen in Equation 2.2, the revenue maximizing, or optimal, ticket price is lower 
when accounting for the price of concessions (and any other non-ticket products/services 
such as merchandise and parking) than it would be if it were set in a vacuum where only 
ticket revenue is accounted for, as in Equation 1.2.  This is consistent with findings in the 
review of literature above.  Specifically, 1)(
)(
211
21 <⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−= P
P
PQ βα
αη , meaning that the 
elasticity for Model 2 is smaller in absolute value terms than for Model 1.  The optimal 
ticket price is set in the inelastic portion of demand.  Predictably, for low concessions 
prices, the impact of concessions revenue on ticket price decision making is minimized.    
In fact, 1,02 −→→ PQP η , which is the optimal price elasticity when not accounting for 
concessions revenues (Model 1). 
Model 3 generalizes Models 1 and 2 by adding cross-price effects to ticket 
demand and concessions demand exhibiting the notion that the total price of attending a 
game is what matters to customers, not just ticket price.  Therefore, let  
211111 PPQ γβα −−=         (3.1) 
be ticket demand, where 1γ  is the incremental effect of concessions prices on ticket 
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demand.  The demand for concessions will be shown by 
122222 PPQ γβα −−= .       (3.2) 
As noted in the equation, ticket price, , affects the demand for concessions in a negative 
way.  If ticket prices are raised, the demand for concessions declines based on
1P
2γ , the 
marginal propensity to purchase concessions based on ticket price changes.  The optimal 
revenue maximizing ticket price is  
1
221
1
1*
1 2
)(
2 β
γγ
β
α PP +−= ,       (3.3) 
with  exogenous.  Even though the concessionaire often sets concessions prices, 
removing this assumption does not change the direction of the impact, only the 
magnitude.  Equation 3.3 shows that the ticket prices ought to be lower if fans care about 
concessions prices.  Specifically, higher 
2P
1γ  or 2γ  leads to lower optimal ticket prices.  
The more sensitive customers are to the price of complementary goods and services, the 
lower ticket prices should be to maximize profits.  Thus, it is important to account for 
cross-price effects when setting prices.  Overall, the price elasticity for Model 3 may be 
higher or lower than for Model 2, depending on the relative magnitudes of  1β , 1γ , and 
2γ .  However, like Model 2, the absolute value of the price elasticity for Model 3 is 
lower than for Model 1.  In the analysis that follows, variable pricing outcomes will be 
determined under two scenarios, one without the cross effects (Model 1) and one with the 
cross effects (Model 3).  Again, Model 1 pertains to teams that either do not receive any 
concessions revenue or receive a fixed payment in exchange for concessions rights.  
Model 3 applies to teams that receive a share of concessions revenues. 
To be clear, these models do not assume profit maximization, win maximization, 
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or something else, only that a team’s objectives are consistent throughout the season.  For 
example, if a team is focused primarily on profits, it will set ticket and concessions prices 
in order to maximize the sum of both revenues. Similarly, if a team is attempting to 
maximize wins, it will still want to price as a profit-maximizer because its relevant costs 
are not variable.  Such a team would likely spend more on players, in order to improve 
winning, than a profit-maximizing team.  However, it will still want to set prices in order 
to maximize revenues from tickets and concessions anyway, just as a profit-maximizing 
team would.  An exception to this argument is if a win-maximizing owner chose to price 
below profit-maximizing levels in order to raise attendance (even though it is lowering 
revenues) to increase the impact of home-field advantage, which would increase the 
likelihood of winning more games and, therefore, satisfy his/her objectives.   
The models also do not need to assume linear demand functions.  Linear demand 
is chosen for simplicity.  As described in the next section, non-linear demand changes the 
magnitudes of the findings.  Using linear demand generates more conservative findings – 
the gains to be had from variable pricing are lower under linear demand. 
The empirical analysis operationalizes this by noting that whatever objective 
function an owner has (winning or profits or a combination of the two), it is assumed that 
prices are set to maximize those objectives.  For a particular game it may be that prices 
are too low or too high given demand, but since one price is charged for the entire season, 
it is objective-maximizing on average. 
One hypothesis stemming from these models is that adoption of variable ticket 
pricing would improve revenues for MLB teams.  Another hypothesis is for those teams 
that are adjusting prices, the amount of adjustment is correct.  For instance, the Cardinals 
 
Variable Ticket Pricing   18 
had only raised their prices for VTP games by $2 for 2002.  In contrast, the Rockies have 
had prices for particular seats that varied by as much as $6 (Rovell, 2002a).  This analysis 
will provide a benchmark for how much teams should be adjusting their prices. 
It is important to note that there are public relations issues that play a role in VTP.  
For example, the Nashville Predators have been thinking about incorporating VTP but 
fear a negative fan backlash at a time they are trying to build a loyal fan base (Cameron, 
2002). A team therefore may opt to raise its prices only nominally to see if there is a 
backlash where fans react with an emotional response that actually shifts demand (not 
slides along demand as price changes are expected to do).  This analysis ignores any 
public relations issues. 
Methods 
The first analysis tested Model 1 where only ticket pricing is accounted for, not 
concessions quantity and price.  The methodology involved analyzing how demand for 
each game deviated from the average demand for each team.  For example, as shown in 
Figure 1, point ‘A’ is on the average demand curve for the Atlanta Braves.  It represents 
the actual average ticket price ($13.06) and average attendance (35,793).  The slope of 
the demand curve is based on the assumption that the price elasticity equals -1.0 (This 
assumption can be relaxed without loss of generality.  For instance, it can be assumed 
that the team prices on the inelastic portion of demand at, say, -0.75).  Therefore, slope 
can be determined from price, quantity, and elasticity. 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
Point ‘B’ is the actual price (still $13.06) and attendance (48,961) for the Braves 
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home opener.  This is the demand for that game given the price.  Demand is known 
because looking at actual attendance reveals it.  As described in the Theoretical 
Foundations section, ticket prices, on average, were optimal for the Braves.  It was 
assumed that each team was doing its best at determining ticket prices and was setting 
them to account for the average expected demand for the entire season.  Therefore, the 
price elasticity was set at -1.0 at point ‘A’.  At point ‘B’ the elasticity changed to –0.73, 
thus it is a sub-optimal price.  Raising price to $15.46 (point ‘C’) changed the elasticity 
back to –1.0 and lowered attendance to 42,371.  Revenue was then calculated for this new 
price and quantity and compared to the actual revenue from that game (measured by 
multiplying the actual average price charged for that game with the actual quantity of 
spectators for that game).  These measurements were taken for each game of the season 
for each team in order to be able to see how adjusted ticket prices affect revenue.  See the 
Appendix for a brief description of the calculations. 
The example above used linear demand.  If a slightly curved demand function is 
used, the gains from variable pricing would be higher because the loss in number of 
attendees is compensated by higher pricing due to the curvature of the demand function.  
As shown in Figure 2, the simplified demand function “Curved Increase” had an optimal 
price point at “D”, while the linear demand function’s optimal price point was “C”.  
Table 3 provides the details of each of these demand functions.  Each demand function 
was shifted the same amount (as shown by point “B”).  Figure 3 shows the associated 
revenue at each point.  The curved demand resulted in higher revenue ($18.52) from 
variable pricing (point “D”) than for the linear demand ($16.00 at point “C”).  Thus, an 
equal increase in the number of attendees will lead to lower gains using linear demand 
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instead of curved demand.  This is also true for a low demand game.  Point “G” is the 
optimal price for the linear demand function and point “F” maximizes revenue for the 
curved demand.  As shown in Table 3, the curved demand function resulted in higher 
revenues from variable ticket pricing.  Intuitively, this was not surprising.  For a given 
price, a curved demand function will result in more attendees (higher quantity) than a 
linear demand function.  A constant elasticity of demand function (CED) has more 
curvature than the ones shown in Figure 2.  Revenue is constant regardless of price for 
CED.  Prices can be set at any level and yield the same revenue.  CED is an unrealistic 
demand function for baseball.  An even more extreme demand function, a super-curved 
demand in which the degree of curvature is greater than that for CED, is such that the 
revenue function looks U-shaped, not hill-shaped as in Figure 3.  In that case, revenue 
maximizing prices are either very low or very high, and unlikely to be consistent with 
reality in baseball.  An example of this type of demand function is )ln(1 QP = .  The use of 
linear demand in the subsequent analysis is conservative in that the gains from variable 
pricing are a lower bound of what would be the case if demand functions for baseball are 
curved.  This reason, along with simplicity and a lack of research about the shape of 
baseball demand functions, was justification for using linear demand in the following 
analysis.  Parallel shifts of the demand function were also assumed because of simplicity 
and a lack of relevant research showing other types of shifts.  Unfortunately, attendance 
by seat location and specific price is not publicly available.  If it were, one could examine 
how much demand changes per price point to get a sense of the nature of the shift in 
demand. 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 and Table 3 about here 
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The subsequent analysis accounted for the possibility that the capacity of a 
stadium prevented the true demand from being revealed.  In other words, sellouts 
typically imply that there was excess demand beyond the capacity of the stadium.  The 
standard result would be to raise prices until the entire stadium is full and there are no 
persons outside who are interested in attending the game at the new raised ticket price.  In 
order to determine how much to raise prices, the amount of excess demand needed to be 
estimated.  This was done utilizing a censored regression, which can forecast the true 
demand as if there were not a capacity constraint.  It used information from uncensored 
observations (those without a capacity constraint as shown by not having sold out) to 
estimate what would have happened without the constraint. 
The censored regression used attendance as the dependent variable and various 
demand factors listed in the second data set described below as the independent variables.  
The result was an empirical model that can be used to forecast what attendance would 
have been for the capacity constrained games.  The methodology was the same as the first 
analysis, but used the new forecasted attendance when estimating optimal prices and 
resulting revenue. 
The final analysis included the focus of Model 3, that the prices of 
complementary goods (tickets and concessions) affect the demand, and hence optimal 
price, for each other.  This analysis created a single demand for the joint product of 
tickets and concessions, with concessions price exogenously determined.  According to 
Financial World, these non-ticket revenues made up 35% of ticket plus non-ticket 
revenues for MLB teams during 1996 (Badenhausen & Nikolov, 1997).  For every dollar 
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spent at a stadium by a patron, thirty-five cents were spent on concessions, merchandise 
and parking.   Therefore, the non-ticket price for each team was set at 54% (54% = 
35%/[1-35%]) of the ticket price as team-specific data on non-ticket revenue was 
unavailable.  Given this new joint demand function, optimal prices were set for each 
game as in the two previous analyses.  The censored regression forecasts of attendance 
were used in this analysis.  This analysis accounted for the combined product of tickets 
and concessions, so as a group the demand elasticity was -1.  Given that the concessions 
price was fixed and positive, the new optimal ticket price would be on the inelastic 
portion of demand.  This was consistent with the findings in the literature. 
These three analyses determined the optimal variable ticket price for nearly every 
game for the 1996 MLB season.  The 1996 season was used because during that year no 
MLB team utilized variable ticket pricing.  It should be noted that 1996 was the first full 
season after the strike of 1994-95.  It is possible that the findings here are not typical of a 
season in Major League Baseball.  However, an important factor in this analysis is the 
shift in demand from game to game.  Compared with 2003, attendance for the 1996 
season has a standard deviation that is only 5% greater than attendance for 2003.  The use 
of more recent data, which would include teams using VTP, raised validity concerns with 
the attempt to predict additional revenue generated through the use of VTP.  The use of 
the 1996 data allow the analysis to be consistent across all teams.  The analysis showed 
what ticket price should have been charged with the corresponding results had every team 
participated in optimal VTP.  In order to achieve this, data for 2,193 of the 2,268 
scheduled regular season games was used.  The few games not used in the analysis either 
lacked sufficient data, were double-headers, or were rainouts that were never made up.   
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The data was broken into two sets.  One set was used to forecast optimal VTP.  It 
included actual attendance, average ticket price, stadium capacity, and average 
concessions expenditures.  Attendance data came from www.sportsline.com, ticket price 
data from Team Marketing Report, stadium capacity data from www.ballparks.com, and 
concessions information from Financial World’s financial report on baseball for the 1996 
season (Badenhausen & Nikolov, 1997).  Table 2 (columns 1 & 4) shows average 
attendance and average ticket price for each team for the 1996 season.  
The second set of data was used to make an adjustment to demand for games that 
are censored by capacity constraints, namely games that are sold out or nearly sold out.  
This adjusted demand was then used in the VTP analysis.  This data set contained actual 
attendance, the number of wins by the home team and visiting team in the previous 
season, the population of the local CMSA, indicator variables for opening day, a new 
stadium, a weekend game, and a game in April.  All data for this data set came from 
www.sportsline.com except population, which was obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  Table 4 contains summary statistics of the data. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Results 
 Based on the estimates from the test of Model 1, had the Atlanta Braves, for 
example, raised ticket prices for the opening game, actual attendance would have been 
42,371 with actual ticket revenues increasing by $15,817 or 2.5% for that game.  An 
elasticity of –1.0 implies revenue maximization.  Yet, the analysis could have begun with 
any elasticity as long as the resulting elasticity at point ‘C’ is the same as that at point ‘A’ 
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(see Figure 1).  Therefore, this does not require revenue maximization or profit 
maximization, only consistency in terms of the objectives of the franchise throughout the 
season. 
Continuing with the Braves example, Table 5 shows the results for every odd 
home game.  The findings show that there are fewer games that have excess demand 
(although they have a higher average excess demand) than there are games that have 
lower demand than average (Figure 4).  In fact, 30 out of 81 Braves home games had 
demand exceed the average, and the average optimal price increase is estimated to be 
11.0% while the average decreased price is estimated to be -6.5%.  Also, as expected, the 
high demand games generally are for an entire series.  Thus, one VTP strategy for the 
Braves would be to variable price for some high demand series and simply lower prices 
on the other games in general (as a public relations move and to increase overall 
revenues).   
Insert Table 5 and Figure 4 about here 
 
The bottom row of Table 5 shows the average results for the entire Braves season.  
The average per game revenue increase for the season is $4,367 or 0.9%.  The results for 
each team are shown in Table 2.  Columns 8 and 12 show the result from Table 5 for the 
Braves.  Over the course of the full season, the Braves could have increased their ticket 
revenues by $353,706 or 0.9%. 
Variable pricing would have yielded an average of approximately $504,000 per 
year in additional revenue for each Major League team, ceteris paribus, or over $14 
million for the league as a whole.  This amounts to only about a 2.6% increase above 
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what occurs when prices are not varied, as shown in Table 2.  The amount of variation in 
ticket prices is just over 11%, on average.  That such a large price swing only yields a 
revenue swing four times smaller is simply based on the large change in attendance that 
occurs when prices are varied.  This occurs with all downward sloping demand curves, 
and is not unique to baseball.  For the 1996 season, the largest revenue gain would have 
been for the New York Yankees, which would have generated an extra $1.24 million in 
ticket revenue, or a 3.7% increase.  The largest percentage revenue gain would have been 
for the San Francisco Giants.  The Giants would have seen an estimated 6.7% increase in 
revenue, or $1.01 million, had they used optimal VTP.  The smallest amount of impact 
would have been for the Colorado Rockies, which averaged only plus or minus eighty 
patrons in absolute deviation from the mean attendance per game throughout the 1996 
season.  In fact, teams with the lowest average attendance benefit the most from variable 
pricing.  This is not surprising since those teams tend to have the highest variation in 
attendance allowing them to gain from dynamic pricing. 
The reason that the Rockies would apparently gain the least from VTP is that it 
had many sellouts in 1996.  As described in the Methodology section, a censored 
regression is carried out in order to forecast the true demand above the capacity 
constraint.  While there are many more factors that affect game-by-game attendance than 
those used here, this analysis used only those factors known prior to the time ticket price 
setting occured.  Thus, only factors known prior to the beginning of the season are used 
to be consistent with what would be known by team management when setting prices.  
The Wald Chi-squared test of significance showed that the model was significant at the 
0.001% level with a Wald statistic of 906.6.  A potential problem is that the errors for a 
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series between two teams may not be independent.  It is expected that across different 
groups of games (a three game series for example) there exists independence of the 
errors, but not necessarily within each group.  This type of clustered correlation leads to 
understating the standard errors.  A robust estimator of the variance is used to correct the 
standard errors.  There is no evidence of multicollinearity among the independent 
variables.  As expected, there is evidence of omitted variables missing from the 
regression.  As explained above, performance-specific factors that are only known to 
price setters once the season has begun, such as the home pitcher’s earned run average at 
that point during the season, were omitted.  The variance-inflation factor (VIF) averaged 
1.19 across the group of variables tested for multicollinearity, with the largest VIF at 
1.58.  The Ramsey RESET test shows evidence of omitted variables with an F-statistic of 
29.67. 
Table 6 shows the results of the censored regression.  The signs of the coefficients 
are as expected.  Out of 2,193 games, only 109 were sold out.  A sellout for these 
purposes is defined as any game where actual attendance is 99.0% or higher of stadium 
capacity.  The estimate of attendance for these 109 games is based on the predicted 
values from the censored regression. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
As shown in Table 7, ten teams had adjustments to their attendance based on the 
censored regression.  The results are similar to that for Table 2 except column 13 shows 
the gain for those ten teams, versus Table 2, if they account for the capacity constraint 
when adjusting their prices for their VTP strategy.  Overall, adjusting for demand beyond 
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stadium capacity raises the increased revenue from VTP policies from $14.1 million to 
$16.5 million for the league as a whole. 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
 
The final analysis addressed Model 3 from the Theoretical Foundations section 
by accounting for non-ticket revenues such as concessions, merchandise, and parking.  
Table 8 shows the results of allowing the team to vary ticket prices while accounting for 
non-ticket prices in order to maximize its objectives. 
Insert Table 8 about here. 
 
Columns 9, 10, and 11 in Table 8 illustrate that the average team would have 
gained $911,000 in ticket and non-ticket revenue by adopting a variable ticket pricing 
policy while accounting for non-ticket prices.  The league overall would have gained 
$25.5 million.  The Cleveland Indians would have earned the most, over $2.2 million, 
from such a policy. 
Discussion 
This analysis has shown that Major League Baseball could have increased ticket 
revenues by approximately 2.8%, or $16.5 million, and total stadium revenues by about 
$25.5 million for the 1996 season if teams utilized VTP.  Total revenues in MLB are 
estimated to have grown from $1.78 billion in 1996 to approximately $4.3 billion in 
2003, or 250%.  Similar changes in the effect of VTP strategies as discovered in this 
study would yield nearly $40 million in ticket revenue and over $60 million in ticket plus 
non-ticket revenue for MLB.  Therefore, it behooves team owners and the league office 
 
Variable Ticket Pricing   28 
to consider and implement VTP strategies, especially since teams and the league are 
constantly searching for ways to increase revenues. 
The San Francisco Giants would have seen an estimated 6.7% increase in ticket 
revenue, or $1.01 million, had they used optimal VTP in 1996. Interestingly, the Giants 
had considered utilizing variable ticket pricing since the 1996 season because they had 
noticed a huge variation in attendance patterns at Candlestick Park, the team’s then-home 
facility (King, 2002a). In addition to weather issues (pleasant for day games, frigid for 
night contests) in their facility, the Giants of the mid-1990s occasionally fielded teams of 
lower quality. The results of this study would strongly suggest that teams in similar 
facility or on-the-field talent situations maximize their revenues through VTP.      
The results of this study support the utilization of VTP both to increase as well as 
decrease prices from average seasonal levels. The data showed fewer games with excess 
demand than those with diminished demand. However, the selected games with excess 
demand deviated from the mean at a greater rate than those with decreased demand. 
Currently, most MLB teams have focused their VTP strategies on the revenue potential of 
increased prices from highly demanded games (King, 2002a). However, it appears that 
some teams have begun to realize the potential benefit of attracting fans to less desirable 
contests by lowering prices (King, 2002b). The New York Yankees sold $5 tickets in 
certain sections of Yankee Stadium on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays in 2003 
(King, 2003). 
Lowering ticket prices for less desirable games would potentially create more 
positive relationships between teams and local municipalities. Major League Baseball 
teams have often been chastised for seeking subsidies for new revenue generating 
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facilities that are financially inaccessible to many taxpayers (Pappas, 2002; O’Keefe, 
2004). Given the number of games in a typical season that have demand below the yearly 
average (Figure 4), lowering prices creates an opportunity for teams to potentially attract 
new or disenfranchised fans and presents local governments with a more favorable 
reaction to their public policy decisions supporting the local franchise.  Marketing less 
desirable games with lower ticket prices as “value” games, as the Chicago Cubs, 
Colorado Rockies, New York Mets, Tampa Bay Devil Rays, and Toronto Blue Jays did 
in 2004, allows teams to reach market segments perhaps otherwise unreachable due to 
pricing/income issues, in addition to the aforementioned public relations benefits. 
Currently, teams might not want to implement multiple price points for each game 
as shown in Figure 4.  As discussed in Levy, Dutta, Bergen and Venable (1997), menu 
costs affect the frequency and desire to change prices to reflect changes in demand or 
supply.  Menu costs are costs associated with physically changing prices on products, 
having to look up prices to tell a customer the price for a particular game, or more 
generally any costs associated with having more than one price for a product or service.  
Additionally, asymmetric information, search costs, and simple confusion for customers 
regarding the price for different games may cause franchises to have fewer prices for a 
particular seat throughout the season than variable pricing predicts. For this reason, many 
teams have only utilized a minimal number of ticket-pricing tiers, usually two-to-four, in 
their variable ticket pricing system (Rovell, 2002a)  
Confusion and the additional costs associated with changing ticket prices may 
already be in the process of being eliminated. Kevin Fenton, Colorado Rockies senior 
director of ticket operations, noted that once the initial confusion regarding multiple price 
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points for games is overcome, patrons realize that tickets can be priced like other 
industries (Rovell, 2002a). In the near future, the negative fan reaction to changing ticket 
price will likely be alleviated if not eliminated (Adams, 2003). Ticket offices are also 
now better equipped to handle menu costs issues. Although ticket offices were not 
prepared to handle extensive variable ticket pricing in the 1990s, recent technological 
advances have allowed most American professional sport teams to implement new ticket 
policies such as bar coded and print-at-home tickets and to prepare for extensive variable 
ticket pricing in the future (Zoltak, 2002). 
An initial VTP recommendation is that for every 10% increase in attendance (or 
specifically, expected attendance) above the average, teams should raise ticket prices by 
5% and receive a gain of 1.2% in ticket revenue. The practical use of variable pricing, 
however, would entail creating at most five different prices for each seat in a stadium 
throughout the season, not a different price for each game. High demand games or series 
should be priced accordingly, but teams should not forget the potential benefits of 
lowering price for less desired games. The present findings reinforce previous research 
identifying factors such as day of the week or rivalry game as affecting demand for MLB 
tickets. 
Using the Atlanta Braves again as an example, the average attendance was 
35,793.  Based upon the variable pricing ticket prices from Table 5, the recommended 
pricing schedule for 1996 would have been $12.00, $13.06, and $15.50.  A descriptive 
analysis of Braves attendance revealed three tiers of games that corresponded with the 
three price points: games with attendance below 28,831 (greater than -1 SD from the 
mean), games with an attendance of 28,832 to 42,755 (between 1 and -1 SD from the 
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mean), and games with an attendance over 42,756 (greater than 1 SD from the mean).  A 
factor analysis of games falling within each tier was then performed to finalize the 
recommended pricing schedule. 
For the Braves, a Tier One game (average price of $12.00) would have included 
games from the second game of the season to May 14, played Sunday to Thursday.  
Fifteen games would have therefore been classified as Tier One.  A Tier Three game 
(average price of $15.50) would have included all games played on Saturday, opening 
day, the July 4 game, the final home stand of the season, and games played after May 14 
against the Los Angeles Dodgers, a former division rival.  Twenty-two games would 
have fallen into this tier.  The remaining 44 games would have been classified Tier Two 
with an average ticket price of $13.06, which was the average ticket price for the 1996 
season. 
The hypothesis that the few teams that are administering variable ticket pricing 
are doing so properly is consistent with the findings. In fact, the present analysis shows 
that optimal variable ticket pricing is managed by small changes in ticket prices. The 
Giants expected to gain an additional $1 million from variable ticket pricing in 2002 
(Isidore, 2002; Rovell, 2002a). The Giants VTP strategy in 2002 affected only 39 of their 
81 home games (all weekend dates). The present analysis shows a gain of about $1 
million for the 1996 season if optimal pricing were used by the Giants. 
In 2002, the Atlanta Braves instituted a VTP strategy for 21 home games – 
Fridays from May through August and Saturdays throughout the whole season. During 
these games ticket prices were increased by $3, or about 14%.  Testing the same policy 
for the 1996 data, the Atlanta Braves would have 22 home games with VTP utilizing a 
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9% increase in price. Interestingly, the Braves actual policy is more aggressive than the 
data show for 1996.  The St. Louis Cardinals raised prices in 2002 for summer games by 
$2, or 8%.  The 1996 data show that an optimal VTP strategy would raise prices by about 
9%. 
Directions for Future Research 
 There are many areas of inquiry for the future.  An analysis of more recent data 
that include teams utilizing VTP is warranted.  The practical application of VTP requires 
one to be able to accurately forecast the relative attendance of future games.  In other 
words, in order to know which games to have higher prices for and which games to have 
lower prices for, team management needs to know whether there is consistency from one 
season to the next in terms of relative attendance.  An interesting behavioral issue is 
whether the implementation of VTP in earlier games affects the demand for subsequent 
games.  
One factor unaccounted for in this study is the marketing strategies utilized by 
organizations in conjunction with VTP price levels.  The projected revenue increases 
identified in this study could potentially be increased substantially by incorporating VTP 
pricing into teams’ marketing plans. Although many MLB teams assign each 
game/product into VTP levels based on game/product characteristics, little research has 
investigated how those games of varying characteristics are marketed to different 
demographic segments of consumers.  
In addition, research investigating education and public relations activities related 
to variable ticket pricing should be conducted. Although fans may initially perceive 
variable pricing as a gauging mechanism, for some fans variable ticket pricing may allow 
 
Variable Ticket Pricing   33 
some “expensive” games to now become more affordable. Methods to assuage consumer 
fears and to attract potentially new consumers should be researched.  Additionally, 
implementation costs of VTP programs, such as menu costs and staff training, should be 
examined and accounted for in future economic examinations of VTP. 
 Finally, future research should investigate the practical application and public 
reaction to future variable pricing systems utilizing technology to change prices by the 
day, hour, or even minute. Few teams have implemented VTP at this point, believing that 
widespread use of ticket pricing based completely on supply and demand would not be 
met with agreement by some consumers (Cameron, 2002). In particular, research should 
be conducted to identify methods to protect or enhance value to season ticket purchasers 
when a minute-by-minute VTP policy is implemented.    
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Appendix 
In order to calculate the new price and quantity where revenue is maximized ( 1−=η ) 
when the demand curve shifts, refer to Figure 1 at Point A and let 
 
793,35=AQ , , and set 06.13$=AP 1)(*)( −=ΔΔ= AAAAA PQQPη . 
 
At Point C, let 
 
377,422)961,48793,35(2)( =+=+= BAC QQQ , 
46.15$)793,3506.13$(*377,42*1)(** =−−=−= AACAC QPQP η  
 
The results for the new price and quantity rely on two attributes of linear demand 
functions.  First, the optimal quantity ( ) is simply the average of the old quantity ( ) 
and the new actual quantity ( ).  Second, the new optimal price utilizes the elasticity 
formula, 
CQ AQ
BQ
1)(*)( −=ΔΔ= AACCC PQQPη , and solves for .  A key substitute is to 
note that 
AP
AAAA QPPQ −=ΔΔ )( , because the inverse of the slope is constant for the old 
demand and new demand.  Also,  and  are given, and AP AQ Aη  is set equal to -1. This 
can be seen in the elasticity formula from above, 1)(*)( −=Δ= Δ AAAA PQP AQη . 
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Table 1 
 
2004 MLB Variable Ticket Pricing Programsa 
 
   
Team Levels Levels (price for typical outfield bleacher seats) 
   
   
Arizona Diamondbacks 3 Premier ($18), Weekend ($15), Weekday ($13) 
Atlanta Braves 2 Premium ($21), Regular ($18) 
Chicago Cubs 3 Prime ($35), Regular ($26), Value ($15) 
Chicago White Sox 2 Weekend ($26), Weekday ($22) 
Colorado Rockies 4 Marquee ($21), Classic ($19), Premium ($17),  
Value ($11) 
New York Mets 4 Gold ($16), Silver ($14), Bronze ($12),  
Value ($5) 
San Francisco Giants 2 Friday-Sunday ($21), Monday-Thursday ($16) 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays 3 Prime ($20), Regular ($17), Value ($10) 
Toronto Blue Jays 3 Premium ($26), Regular ($23), Value ($15) 
   
Note. Different seating configurations of each stadium make comparing like seats 
difficult; however, this attempt was made to provide the reader with an idea of the range 
of price levels used by each team for similar seats. 
 
aSource: www.mlb.com. 
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Table 2 
 
Summary of Effects of Variable Ticket Pricing (no capacity or non-ticket revenue adjustment) 
Avg. 
Attendance
Avg. 
Absolute 
Change
Avg. 
Deviation 
from Mean
Avg. Ticket 
Price
Avg. 
Absolute 
Change in 
Price
Avg. Actual 
Ticket 
Revenue
Avg. Var. 
Pricing 
Ticket 
Revenue
Avg. Change 
in Ticket 
Revenue
Total Actual 
Ticket Revenue
Total Var. 
Pricing Ticket 
Revenue
Total 
Change in 
Ticket 
Revenue
% Change in 
Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Atlanta 35,793 5,832 16.3% $13.06 8.1% $467,458 $471,825 $4,367 $37,864,102 $38,217,807 $353,706 0.9%
Baltimore 45,475 1,930 4.2% $13.14 2.1% $597,539 $597,909 $371 $48,400,634 $48,430,660 $30,026 0.1%
Boston 28,687 3,847 13.4% $15.43 6.7% $442,643 $445,436 $2,794 $35,854,064 $36,080,352 $226,288 0.6%
California 22,476 4,899 21.8% $8.44 10.9% $189,697 $193,539 $3,842 $15,365,441 $15,676,653 $311,212 2.0%
Chicago (AL) 21,115 4,530 21.5% $14.11 10.7% $297,927 $303,781 $5,854 $24,132,054 $24,606,230 $474,176 2.0%
Chicago (NL) 28,606 6,854 24.0% $13.12 12.0% $375,309 $382,932 $7,622 $30,400,069 $31,017,468 $617,399 2.0%
Cincinnati 24,097 4,492 18.6% $7.95 9.3% $191,568 $194,618 $3,049 $15,517,036 $15,764,032 $246,996 1.6%
Cleveland 41,983 512 1.2% $14.52 0.6% $609,592 $609,629 $37 $49,376,968 $49,379,960 $2,992 0.0%
Colorado 48,037 80 0.2% $10.61 0.1% $509,675 $509,679 $4 $41,283,673 $41,284,030 $357 0.0%
Detroit 14,464 5,018 34.7% $10.60 17.3% $153,322 $162,531 $9,209 $12,419,066 $13,165,021 $745,954 6.0%
Florida 21,839 4,541 20.8% $10.37 10.4% $226,469 $230,737 $4,268 $18,343,988 $18,689,707 $345,720 1.9%
Houston 24,394 7,362 30.2% $10.65 15.1% $259,793 $268,433 $8,640 $21,043,206 $21,743,062 $699,856 3.3%
Kansas City 17,949 4,013 22.4% $9.74 11.2% $174,828 $178,510 $3,682 $14,161,039 $14,459,292 $298,253 2.1%
Los Angeles 39,364 7,038 17.9% $9.94 8.9% $391,274 $395,669 $4,394 $31,693,231 $32,049,165 $355,934 1.1%
Milwaukee 16,847 5,594 33.2% $9.37 16.6% $157,853 $165,387 $7,535 $12,786,054 $13,396,356 $610,302 4.8%
Minnesota 17,930 4,899 27.3% $10.16 13.7% $182,170 $188,905 $6,735 $14,755,746 $15,301,288 $545,542 3.7%
Montreal 19,982 7,149 35.8% $9.07 17.9% $181,240 $190,229 $8,989 $14,680,457 $15,408,584 $728,127 5.0%
New York (AL) 28,371 8,999 31.7% $14.58 15.9% $413,655 $428,965 $15,310 $33,506,040 $34,746,176 $1,240,136 3.7%
New York (NL) 20,260 4,610 22.8% $11.83 11.4% $239,676 $245,833 $6,157 $19,413,778 $19,912,512 $498,734 2.6%
Oakland 14,339 5,183 36.1% $11.34 18.1% $162,607 $171,942 $9,335 $13,171,166 $13,927,263 $756,097 5.7%
Philadelphia 23,077 4,679 20.3% $11.01 10.1% $254,072 $258,556 $4,483 $20,579,872 $20,943,035 $363,163 1.8%
Pittsburgh 17,039 5,914 34.7% $10.09 17.4% $171,919 $179,698 $7,779 $13,925,450 $14,555,555 $630,106 4.5%
San Diego 27,258 10,474 38.4% $9.88 19.2% $269,311 $284,010 $14,698 $21,814,230 $23,004,773 $1,190,543 5.5%
San Francisco 17,548 6,898 39.3% $10.61 19.7% $186,182 $198,697 $12,515 $15,080,772 $16,094,448 $1,013,676 6.7%
Seattle 33,593 9,398 28.0% $11.59 14.0% $389,349 $400,760 $11,411 $31,537,236 $32,461,526 $924,289 2.9%
St. Louis 32,912 6,038 18.3% $9.91 9.2% $326,153 $330,616 $4,463 $26,418,415 $26,779,886 $361,472 1.4%
Texas 36,111 6,664 18.5% $11.96 9.2% $431,888 $437,077 $5,189 $34,982,929 $35,403,253 $420,324 1.2%
Toronto 31,600 2,718 8.6% $13.93 4.3% $440,190 $441,845 $1,655 $35,655,410 $35,789,472 $134,063 0.4%
Average 26,827 5,363 22.9% $11.32 11.4% $310,477 $316,705 $6,228 $25,148,647 $25,653,127 $504,480 2.62%
Note: The total change in ticket revenue accounting for VTP across MLB is $14.1 million.
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Table 3 
 
          Difference in revenue gain from non-linear demand versus linear demand 
 
 
 
Model Demand Function Price Quantity Revenue
Corresponding 
Point on Graph
Gain in Revenue from 
New Price vs. Using 
Old Price
Linear P=8-4Q 4.00$          1.00 4.00$           A N/A
Curved P=(Q-3)2 4.00$          1.00 4.00$           A N/A
Linear Increase P=16-4Q 8.00$          2.00 16.00$         C 33.33%
  P=16-4Q at old price 4.00$          3.00 12.00$         B N/A
Curved Increase P=(Q-5)2 11.11$        1.67 18.52$         D 54.32%
  P=(Q-5)2 at old price 4.00$          3.00 12.00$         B N/A
Linear Decrease P=6-4Q 3.00$          0.75 2.25$           G 12.50%
  P=6-4Q at old price 4.00$          0.50 2.00$           E N/A
Curved Decrease P=(Q-2.5)2 2.78$          0.83 2.31$           F 15.74%
  P=(Q-2.5)2 at old price 4.00$          0.50 2.00$           E N/A  
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Table 4 
 
Summary Statistics of the Censored Regression Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
    Game Attendance 26,868 11,852 6,021 57,467
Home Team Previous Season's Wins 81.92 10.02 56 100
Visiting Team Previous Season's Wins 81.99 10.11 56 100
Opening Day 0.008 0.090 0 1
Weekend Game 0.477 0.499 0 1
New Stadium 0.215 0.411 0 1
Population of CMSA 5,997,132 4,774,503 1,640,831 18,107,235
Game is Played During April 0.162 0.368 0 1
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Table 5 
 
Summary of Atlanta Braves Game-by-Game Variable Pricing Outcomes (odd-numbered games are shown to save space) 
Game 
Number Attendance
Difference 
from Avg.
Percentage Change 
from Avg.
Variable Pricing 
Attendance
Avg. Ticket Price 
for Season
Variable Pricing 
Ticket Price
Percentage 
Price Change
Actual 
Revenue
Variable Pricing 
Revenue
Revenue 
Increase
% Revenue 
Increase
1 48,961 13,168 36.8% 42,377 $13.06 $15.46 18.4% $639,431 $655,247 $15,817 2.5%
3 30,271 -5,522 -15.4% 33,032 $13.06 $12.05 -7.7% $395,339 $398,121 $2,782 0.7%
5 34,649 -1,144 -3.2% 35,221 $13.06 $12.85 -1.6% $452,516 $452,635 $119 0.0%
7 26,635 -9,158 -25.6% 31,214 $13.06 $11.39 -12.8% $347,853 $355,504 $7,651 2.2%
9 25,300 -10,493 -29.3% 30,547 $13.06 $11.15 -14.7% $330,418 $340,462 $10,044 3.0%
11 31,893 -3,900 -10.9% 33,843 $13.06 $12.35 -5.4% $416,523 $417,910 $1,388 0.3%
13 33,080 -2,713 -7.6% 34,437 $13.06 $12.57 -3.8% $432,025 $432,696 $671 0.2%
15 37,697 1,904 5.3% 36,745 $13.06 $13.41 2.7% $492,323 $492,653 $331 0.1%
17 35,471 -322 -0.9% 35,632 $13.06 $13.00 -0.4% $463,251 $463,261 $9 0.0%
19 29,976 -5,817 -16.3% 32,885 $13.06 $12.00 -8.1% $391,487 $394,573 $3,087 0.8%
21 28,583 -7,210 -20.1% 32,188 $13.06 $11.74 -10.1% $373,294 $378,036 $4,742 1.3%
23 30,917 -4,876 -13.6% 33,355 $13.06 $12.17 -6.8% $403,776 $405,945 $2,169 0.5%
25 49,553 13,760 38.4% 42,673 $13.06 $15.57 19.2% $647,162 $664,433 $17,271 2.7%
27 29,984 -5,809 -16.2% 32,889 $13.06 $12.00 -8.1% $391,591 $394,669 $3,078 0.8%
29 33,186 -2,607 -7.3% 34,490 $13.06 $12.58 -3.6% $433,409 $434,029 $620 0.1%
31 32,199 -3,594 -10.0% 33,996 $13.06 $12.40 -5.0% $420,519 $421,697 $1,178 0.3%
33 39,463 3,670 10.3% 37,628 $13.06 $13.73 5.1% $515,387 $516,615 $1,229 0.2%
35 49,726 13,933 38.9% 42,760 $13.06 $15.60 19.5% $649,422 $667,129 $17,708 2.7%
37 32,934 -2,859 -8.0% 34,364 $13.06 $12.54 -4.0% $430,118 $430,864 $746 0.2%
39 34,823 -970 -2.7% 35,308 $13.06 $12.88 -1.4% $454,788 $454,874 $86 0.0%
41 49,365 13,572 37.9% 42,579 $13.06 $15.54 19.0% $644,707 $661,509 $16,802 2.6%
43 31,971 -3,822 -10.7% 33,882 $13.06 $12.36 -5.3% $417,541 $418,874 $1,333 0.3%
45 33,186 -2,607 -7.3% 34,490 $13.06 $12.58 -3.6% $433,409 $434,029 $620 0.1%
47 49,060 13,267 37.1% 42,427 $13.06 $15.48 18.5% $640,724 $656,779 $16,055 2.5%
49 41,619 5,826 16.3% 38,706 $13.06 $14.12 8.1% $543,544 $546,640 $3,096 0.6%
51 33,208 -2,585 -7.2% 34,501 $13.06 $12.59 -3.6% $433,696 $434,306 $610 0.1%
53 36,953 1,160 3.2% 36,373 $13.06 $13.27 1.6% $482,606 $482,729 $123 0.0%
55 32,708 -3,085 -8.6% 34,251 $13.06 $12.50 -4.3% $427,166 $428,035 $868 0.2%
57 32,036 -3,757 -10.5% 33,915 $13.06 $12.37 -5.2% $418,390 $419,678 $1,288 0.3%
59 32,401 -3,392 -9.5% 34,097 $13.06 $12.44 -4.7% $423,157 $424,207 $1,050 0.2%
61 46,064 10,271 28.7% 40,929 $13.06 $14.93 14.3% $601,596 $611,219 $9,623 1.6%
63 39,210 3,417 9.5% 37,502 $13.06 $13.68 4.8% $512,083 $513,148 $1,065 0.2%
65 31,587 -4,206 -11.8% 33,690 $13.06 $12.29 -5.9% $412,526 $414,140 $1,614 0.4%
67 29,213 -6,580 -18.4% 32,503 $13.06 $11.86 -9.2% $381,522 $385,471 $3,950 1.0%
69 38,210 2,417 6.8% 37,002 $13.06 $13.50 3.4% $499,023 $499,555 $533 0.1%
71 35,176 -617 -1.7% 35,485 $13.06 $12.95 -0.9% $459,399 $459,433 $35 0.0%
73 47,130 11,337 31.7% 41,462 $13.06 $15.13 15.8% $615,518 $627,242 $11,724 1.9%
75 32,109 -3,684 -10.3% 33,951 $13.06 $12.39 -5.1% $419,344 $420,582 $1,238 0.3%
77 37,193 1,400 3.9% 36,493 $13.06 $13.32 2.0% $485,741 $485,919 $179 0.0%
79 49,265 13,472 37.6% 42,529 $13.06 $15.52 18.8% $643,401 $659,956 $16,555 2.6%
81 49,083 13,290 37.1% 42,438 $13.06 $15.48 18.6% $641,024 $657,135 $16,111 2.5%
Avg. 1 35,793 5,832 16.3% 35,793 $13.06 $13.06 8.1% $467,458 $471,825 $4,367 0.9%
1The averages in the last row are averages of the absolute value of each number.
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Table 6 
 
Censored Regression Results to Create Forecasts for Capacity Constrained Attendance 
 
 
 
 
  Dependent Variable Game-by-Game Attendance
  Number of observations 2193
  Number of uncensored observations 2084
  Wald  Chi2 906.60
  Prob > Chi2 0.000
  Log Likelihood -21,989.20
Coefficient Std.Error z P>|z| Lower Bound Upper Bound
Constant Term -28,220.88 5,587.69 -5.05 0.00 -40,513.80 -15,927.96
Home Team Last Season's Wins 512.18 32.97 15.53 0.00 439.65 584.72
Visiting Team Last Season's Wins 138.59 33.14 4.18 0.00 65.68 211.50
Opening Day 14,522.00 3,024.93 4.80 0.00 7,867.16 21,176.84
Weekend Game 6,182.30 357.90 17.27 0.00 5,394.92 6,969.68
New Stadium 13,208.40 1,197.69 11.03 0.00 10,573.48 15,843.32
Population of CMSA 0.000053 0.0000090 5.84 0.00 0.000033 0.000073
Game is Played During April -3,045.52 745.38 -4.09 0.00 -4,685.36 -1,405.68
95% Confidence Interval
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Table 7 
 
Summary of Effects of Variable Ticket Pricing (with capacity adjustment, no non-ticket revenue adjustment) 
 
 
Avg. 
Attendance
Avg. 
Absolute 
Change
Avg. 
Deviation 
from Mean
Avg. Ticket 
Price
Avg. Absolute 
Change in Price
Avg. Actual 
Ticket 
Revenue
Avg. Var. 
Pricing Ticket 
Revenue
Avg. Change 
in Ticket 
Revenue
Total Actual 
Ticket Revenue
Total Var. 
Pricing Ticket 
Revenue
Total Change in 
Ticket Revenue
% Change in 
Revenue
Change in Revenue 
vs. VTP w/o 
capacity adj.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Atlanta 35,793 5,878 16.4% $13.06 8.2% $467,458 $472,549 $5,091 $37,864,102 $38,276,489 $412,387 1.1% $58,682
Baltimore 45,475 2,098 4.6% $13.14 2.3% $597,539 $600,204 $2,665 $48,400,634 $48,616,492 $215,859 0.4% $185,832
Boston 28,687 3,952 13.8% $15.43 6.9% $442,643 $447,216 $4,574 $35,854,064 $36,224,534 $370,470 1.0% $144,182
California 22,476 4,899 21.8% $8.44 10.9% $189,697 $193,539 $3,842 $15,365,441 $15,676,653 $311,212 2.0% $0
Chicago (AL) 21,115 4,530 21.5% $14.11 10.7% $297,927 $303,781 $5,854 $24,132,054 $24,606,230 $474,176 2.0% $0
Chicago (NL) 28,606 7,044 24.6% $13.12 12.3% $375,309 $385,912 $10,603 $30,400,069 $31,258,882 $858,813 2.8% $241,414
Cincinnati 24,097 4,549 18.9% $7.95 9.4% $191,568 $195,364 $3,796 $15,517,036 $15,824,475 $307,439 2.0% $60,442
Cleveland 41,983 1,716 4.1% $14.52 2.0% $609,592 $627,443 $17,851 $49,376,968 $50,822,889 $1,445,921 2.9% $1,442,929
Colorado 48,037 144 0.3% $10.61 0.1% $509,675 $510,365 $690 $41,283,673 $41,339,542 $55,869 0.1% $55,512
Detroit 14,464 5,018 34.7% $10.60 17.3% $153,322 $162,531 $9,209 $12,419,066 $13,165,021 $745,954 6.0% $0
Florida 21,839 4,541 20.8% $10.37 10.4% $226,469 $230,737 $4,268 $18,343,988 $18,689,707 $345,720 1.9% $0
Houston 24,394 7,362 30.2% $10.65 15.1% $259,793 $268,433 $8,640 $21,043,206 $21,743,062 $699,856 3.3% $0
Kansas City 17,949 4,013 22.4% $9.74 11.2% $174,828 $178,510 $3,682 $14,161,039 $14,459,292 $298,253 2.1% $0
Los Angeles 39,364 7,038 17.9% $9.94 8.9% $391,274 $395,669 $4,394 $31,693,231 $32,049,165 $355,934 1.1% $0
Milwaukee 16,847 5,594 33.2% $9.37 16.6% $157,853 $165,387 $7,535 $12,786,054 $13,396,356 $610,302 4.8% $0
Minnesota 17,930 4,899 27.3% $10.16 13.7% $182,170 $188,905 $6,735 $14,755,746 $15,301,288 $545,542 3.7% $0
Montreal 19,982 7,155 35.8% $9.07 17.9% $181,240 $190,326 $9,086 $14,680,457 $15,416,441 $735,984 5.0% $7,857
New York (AL) 28,371 8,999 31.7% $14.58 15.9% $413,655 $428,965 $15,310 $33,506,040 $34,746,176 $1,240,136 3.7% $0
New York (NL) 20,260 4,610 22.8% $11.83 11.4% $239,676 $245,833 $6,157 $19,413,778 $19,912,512 $498,734 2.6% $0
Oakland 14,339 5,183 36.1% $11.34 18.1% $162,607 $171,942 $9,335 $13,171,166 $13,927,263 $756,097 5.7% $0
Philadelphia 23,077 4,679 20.3% $11.01 10.1% $254,072 $258,556 $4,483 $20,579,872 $20,943,035 $363,163 1.8% $0
Pittsburgh 17,039 5,914 34.7% $10.09 17.4% $171,919 $179,698 $7,779 $13,925,450 $14,555,555 $630,106 4.5% $0
San Diego 27,258 10,532 38.6% $9.88 19.3% $269,311 $284,842 $15,531 $21,814,230 $23,072,216 $1,257,986 5.8% $67,444
San Francisco 17,548 6,898 39.3% $10.61 19.7% $186,182 $198,697 $12,515 $15,080,772 $16,094,448 $1,013,676 6.7% $0
Seattle 33,593 9,398 28.0% $11.59 14.0% $389,349 $400,760 $11,411 $31,537,236 $32,461,526 $924,289 2.9% $0
St. Louis 32,912 6,110 18.6% $9.91 9.3% $326,153 $331,541 $5,388 $26,418,415 $26,854,854 $436,439 1.7% $74,968
Texas 36,111 6,664 18.5% $11.96 9.2% $431,888 $437,077 $5,189 $34,982,929 $35,403,253 $420,324 1.2% $0
Toronto 31,600 2,718 8.6% $13.93 4.3% $440,190 $441,845 $1,655 $35,655,410 $35,789,472 $134,063 0.4% $0
Average 26,827 5,433 23.0% $11.32 11.5% $310,477 $317,737 $7,260 $25,148,647 $25,736,672 $588,025 2.83% $83,545
Note: The total change in ticket revenue accounting for VTP and capacity issues across MLB is $16.5 million.
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Table 8 
 
Summary of Effects of Variable Ticket Pricing (with capacity adjustment and non-ticket revenue adjustment) 
 
 
 
Avg. 
Attendance
Avg. 
Absolute 
Change
Avg. 
Deviation 
from Mean
Avg. Ticket 
Price
Non-Ticket 
Price
Avg. Actual 
Ticket 
Revenue
Avg. Var. 
Pricing Ticket 
Revenue
Avg. Var. 
Pricing Ticket + 
Non-Ticket 
Revenue
Total Actual 
Ticket + Non-
Ticket Revenue
Total Var. 
Pricing Ticket + 
Non-Ticket 
Revenue
Total Change in 
Ticket + Non-
Ticket Revenue
% Change 
in Total 
Revenue
Total Actual 
Ticket Revenue
Total Variable 
Pricing Ticket 
Revenue
% Change 
in Total 
Ticket 
Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Atlanta 35,793 5,878 16.4% $13.07 $7.18 $467,458 $475,184 $732,451 $58,689,358 $59,328,558 $639,200 1.1% $37,864,102 $38,489,896 1.7%
Baltimore 45,475 2,098 4.6% $13.16 $7.23 $597,539 $601,064 $930,316 $75,020,982 $75,355,563 $334,581 0.4% $48,400,634 $48,686,180 0.6%
Boston 28,687 3,952 13.8% $15.46 $8.49 $442,643 $449,290 $693,186 $55,573,799 $56,148,028 $574,229 1.0% $35,854,064 $36,392,476 1.5%
California 22,476 4,899 21.8% $8.44 $4.64 $189,697 $195,652 $299,985 $23,816,434 $24,298,812 $482,378 2.0% $15,365,441 $15,847,819 3.1%
Chicago (AL) 21,115 4,530 21.5% $14.11 $7.76 $297,927 $307,000 $470,860 $37,404,684 $38,139,656 $734,972 2.0% $24,132,054 $24,867,027 3.0%
Chicago (NL) 28,606 7,044 24.6% $13.16 $7.22 $375,309 $391,059 $598,164 $47,120,107 $48,451,267 $1,331,160 2.8% $30,400,069 $31,675,750 4.2%
Cincinnati 24,097 4,549 18.9% $7.96 $4.37 $191,568 $197,327 $302,814 $24,051,406 $24,527,936 $476,530 2.0% $15,517,036 $15,983,459 3.0%
Cleveland 41,983 1,716 4.1% $14.73 $7.99 $609,592 $632,454 $972,537 $76,534,300 $78,775,478 $2,241,177 2.9% $49,376,968 $51,228,769 3.8%
Colorado 48,037 144 0.3% $10.62 $5.84 $509,675 $510,557 $791,065 $63,989,693 $64,076,289 $86,597 0.1% $41,283,673 $41,355,136 0.2%
Detroit 14,464 5,018 34.7% $10.60 $5.83 $153,322 $167,596 $251,923 $19,249,553 $20,405,782 $1,156,229 6.0% $12,419,066 $13,575,296 9.3%
Florida 21,839 4,541 20.8% $10.37 $5.70 $226,469 $233,085 $357,643 $28,433,181 $28,969,046 $535,865 1.9% $18,343,988 $18,879,853 2.9%
Houston 24,394 7,362 30.2% $10.65 $5.86 $259,793 $273,185 $416,071 $32,616,970 $33,701,747 $1,084,777 3.3% $21,043,206 $22,127,983 5.2%
Kansas City 17,949 4,013 22.4% $9.74 $5.36 $174,828 $180,535 $276,690 $21,949,610 $22,411,903 $462,293 2.1% $14,161,039 $14,623,331 3.3%
Los Angeles 39,364 7,038 17.9% $9.94 $5.47 $391,274 $398,086 $613,286 $49,124,509 $49,676,206 $551,697 1.1% $31,693,231 $32,244,929 1.7%
Milwaukee 16,847 5,594 33.2% $9.37 $5.15 $157,853 $169,531 $256,350 $19,818,383 $20,764,351 $945,968 4.8% $12,786,054 $13,732,021 7.4%
Minnesota 17,930 4,899 27.3% $10.16 $5.59 $182,170 $192,609 $292,802 $22,871,407 $23,716,997 $845,590 3.7% $14,755,746 $15,601,336 5.7%
Montreal 19,982 7,155 35.8% $9.07 $4.99 $181,240 $195,308 $295,006 $22,754,708 $23,895,483 $1,140,776 5.0% $14,680,457 $15,819,930 7.8%
New York (AL) 28,371 8,999 31.7% $14.58 $8.02 $413,655 $437,386 $664,896 $51,934,362 $53,856,573 $1,922,211 3.7% $33,506,040 $35,428,250 5.7%
New York (NL) 20,260 4,610 22.8% $11.83 $6.51 $239,676 $249,220 $381,042 $30,091,356 $30,864,393 $773,037 2.6% $19,413,778 $20,186,815 4.0%
Oakland 14,339 5,183 36.1% $11.34 $6.24 $162,607 $177,076 $266,509 $20,415,308 $21,587,258 $1,171,950 5.7% $13,171,166 $14,343,116 8.9%
Philadelphia 23,077 4,679 20.3% $11.01 $6.06 $254,072 $261,022 $400,762 $31,898,801 $32,461,705 $562,903 1.8% $20,579,872 $21,142,775 2.7%
Pittsburgh 17,039 5,914 34.7% $10.09 $5.55 $171,919 $183,977 $278,532 $21,584,447 $22,561,111 $976,664 4.5% $13,925,450 $14,902,112 7.0%
San Diego 27,258 10,532 38.6% $9.89 $5.43 $269,311 $293,227 $441,505 $33,812,057 $35,761,936 $1,949,879 5.8% $21,814,230 $23,751,402 8.9%
San Francisco 17,548 6,898 39.3% $10.61 $5.84 $186,182 $205,580 $307,980 $23,375,197 $24,946,394 $1,571,197 6.7% $15,080,772 $16,651,969 10.4%
Seattle 33,593 9,398 28.0% $11.59 $6.37 $389,349 $407,036 $621,177 $48,882,717 $50,315,365 $1,432,648 2.9% $31,537,236 $32,969,885 4.5%
St. Louis 32,912 6,110 18.6% $9.92 $5.45 $326,153 $334,308 $513,889 $40,948,543 $41,625,024 $676,481 1.7% $26,418,415 $27,078,914 2.5%
Texas 36,111 6,664 18.5% $11.96 $6.58 $431,888 $439,931 $677,470 $54,223,540 $54,875,042 $651,502 1.2% $34,982,929 $35,634,431 1.9%
Toronto 31,600 2,718 8.6% $13.93 $7.66 $440,190 $442,756 $684,860 $55,265,885 $55,473,682 $207,797 0.4% $35,655,410 $35,863,207 0.6%
Average 26,827 5,433 23.0% $11.33 $6.23 $310,477 $321,466 $492,491.88 $38,980,403 $39,891,842 $911,439 2.83% $25,148,647 $26,038,717 4.34%
Note: The total change in ticket + non-ticket revenue accounting for VTP, capacity issues, and non-ticket revenue across MLB is $25.5 million.  
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1.  Optimal variable pricing adjustment.  (Atlanta: solid line is average demand; dashed line is demand for one game) 
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Figure 2.  Curved demand functions versus linear demand functions. 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 3.  Revenue functions of curved demand versus linear demand. 
 
Variable Ticket Pricing   53 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28
Price
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
Linear Curved Linear Increase Curved Increase Linear Decrease Curved Decrease
A
B
C
D
E
GF
 
Variable Ticket Pricing   54 
 
 Figure Caption 
 
Figure 4.  Atlanta Braves Variable Pricing.
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